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The 'new' Parliament House in Canberra, opened in 1988, was
designed to both symbolise and house representative democracy in
Australia. Both of these functions have made it an important site for
protest - it is a place through which claims are made and concerns
are voiced by a diverse range of political movements and individuals.
But as a public space, it is not only used by protesters to articulate
their position in relation to a wider, general public. Parliament House
has also acted as a public space through which participants in political
movements or 'counterpublics' have negotiated their relationship
with each other. Public space, in other words, acts as both a space
for representation, and a space for formation, when used by
counterpublics engaged in protest.
In this paper, I want to trace the connection between these two
aspects of protest at Parliament House. I argue that this dual
perspective is useful in understanding the dynamics of protest events.
It offers insights for those engaged in protest, as well as those engaged
in regulating it.
I want to start by briefly outlining where this dual perspective
on public space and protest comes from, by considering the
relationship between public space and the public sphere. Next, I
describe the space available for protest at Parliament House and its
regulatory framework. Then the paper looks at two particular protest
events - the rally organised by the ACTU at Parliament House in
August 1996, and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy protest in front of
Old Parliament House. The paper concludes with some more general
thoughts on the relationship between protest and public space.

The public sphere, counterpublics, and public space
This paper is concerned primarily with understanding the protests
of political groups or 'counterpublics' at Parliament House, rather
than individuals. The term 'counterpublic' refers to an arena of
alternative value formation, "where members of subordinated social
groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs"
(Fraser 1992, p. 123). They function as both "spaces of withdrawal
and regroupment", and "bases and training grounds for agitational
activities directed toward wider publics" (Fraser 1992, p. 124: see
also Burgmann and Burgmann 1998).
This concept emerged from recent considerations on the nature
of the political public sphere. Critical theorists like Nancy Fraser
and GeoffEley have argued that rather than thinking of 'the public
sphere' as a single set of institutions for the formation ofa common
political will, it makes more sense to think of it as "the structured
setting where cultural and ideological contest among a variety of
publics takes place" (Eley 1992, p. 306).
So, how do these considerations about counterpublics and the
public sphere help us to think about public space? On one level,
public space can be treated as a spatial manifestation of the public
sphere - in other words, as a space where interaction and contest
among a variety of publics takes place. Public space has therefore
been seen as a space for representation - a space where a
counterpublic can "stake out the space that allows it to be seen"
(Mitchell 1995, p. 115)
But on its own, this picture is too simple. For
counterpublics also must have a space in which alternative

values and opinions can be formed, in order for them to be
represented. These counterpublics do not necessarily exist as a stable
entity with shared values before they protest in public space. They
also form partly through their occupation of public space (Katznelson
1992; Iveson 1998). Public space therefore also acts as a space for
formation, as well as a space for representation.
In talking about counterpublic formation, I am referring to the
process offormation, which I take to be an on-going one. The process
of formation may have begun elsewhere, and at another time, to a
given protest. It also may involve some participants obstructing the
formation of a stable counterpublic along particular lines, or
negotiating over its future direction.
This complicates our approach to understanding protest. It
suggests that we can evaluate public space protests on two distinct
but related grounds - their ability to make claims in the wider public,
as well as their contribution to group formation and consolidation.
As we shall see, there are tensions involved in simultaneously
managing both of these aspects of protest.

Parliament House
The use of a public space like Parliament House for protest is in the
first instance structured or constrained by the design and regulation
of the space itself. The conduct of protest at Parliament House is
regulated by the Guidelines for Protests, Demonstrations and Public
Assemblies within the Parliamentary Precincts issued by the
Presiding Officers of the Parliament. These guidelines attempt to
'balance' the right to protest with administrative and security
requirements, and act in conjunction with other laws such as the
Public Order Act i971. They proscribe the space in which protests
can take place, and their duration. Protest is confined to a space
across the road from the main entrance to the Parliament. Permits
are required for any permanent structures, in an attempt to limit the
potential for protesters to spend any more than a few hours conducting
their protest.
These guidelines are informed by a particular perspective on
why protesters choose to conduct their protest at Parliament House.
In justifying the guidelines for protest, one ofthe Presiding Officers
has argued that:
What we have tried to say is that, by having a demonstration area
where people can get their point of view across, generally speaking,
that [balance between right to protest and other administrative needs1
is achievable. Most people who come here, if they have a legitimate
beef, arouse the interest of the media. After all, that is what they are
looking to do. They want to capture that ten second grab on the
nightly news so that they can get their point across. (quoted in inquiry
into the Right to Legitimately Protest, Transcript ofEvidence, 1995,
p. 195)
It is assumed that protesters form their beliefs prior to protest, and
simply use public spaces like Parliament House as a stage from which
to voice these opinions.
The regulations have consequences for both aspects of protest
identified above. First, there is an attempt to limit the ways in which
protesters can represent themselves and their issues to the
wider pUblic. Protests at Parliament House which attempt to

put claims directly to other members of the public entering the
building, or to politicians (all of whom use entrances where protest
is forbidden) are discouraged. Protests instead are encouraged to
seek a mediated representation of their claims, via the mass media.
Protests which involve structures and a long duration are also
discouraged. This means that protesters are encouraged to put their
point across in as short a time as possible, rather than to develop or
form their opinions by establishing any physical structures that will
sustain interaction among members of a protest group.
Of course, while these regulations provide constraints to
protesters, they do not shut down all alternative possibilities. They
are negotiated with varying degrees of success by counterpublics
using Parliament House as a venue for protest.

Cavalcade to Canberra, 1996
The Coalition Government elected in March 1996 quickly earned
the dislike of union and community sector groups with its program
of industrial relations legislation and cuts to public sector spending.
The ACTU organised a 'cavalcade to Canberra' on 19 August 1996
with the intention of putting public pressure on the government, by
bringing unionists together with community and indigenous groups
in a show of general community opposition to the government's
direction. It was hoped that up to 30,000 people would attend, and
specially commissioned buses and trains were organised for
participants from Melbourne and Sydney.
While on some accounts the target of30,000 was reached, things
otherwise did not go according to plan. A stage had been erected in
the designated protest area at the top of Federation Mall, facing down
the Mall towards Old Parliament House. However, while thousands
listened to speeches from a range of community, union and political
leaders, others tried to force their way into new Parliament House in
what the media quickly dubbed a 'riot'. Some protesters and police
officers were injured in the altercations, and some damage was done
to the doors and the Parliamentary Gift Shop.
The situation arose when a large group of protesters approached
the rally along Commonwealth Drive, rather than from the bottom
ofFederat'ion Mall as originally planned. There is debate over whether
this change of plans was initiated by protesters or police (see Inquiry
into the Right to Legitimately Protest, Transcript ofEvidence, Friday
8 November, 1996, p. 523-531). In any case, the result was that a
large group found themselves stuck between the public Forecourt
and the back of the stage, rather than in front of the stage further
down the Mall. A thin line of police attempted to block their entry to
the Forecourt and direct the group back in front of the stage. A
bottleneck ensued, and as chants of 'let them through' erupted from
the crowd, some members ofthe group broke through the police line
and headed for the public entrance.
The media and the government condemned the violence and
sought to attribute blame to the ACTU as rally organiser. Headlines
the next day such as "Rioters storm Parliament" (The Australian,
August 20 1996, p.l), "Parliament besieged" (The Age August 20
1996, p.l) and "Bloody Protest" (The Canberra Times, August 20
1996, p.l) were all accompanied by graphic pictures of the scumes
and bloody-faced protesters. Editorials proclaimed "Canberra riot a
disgrace" (The Australian) and labeled it "The ACTU's
Responsibility" (The Sydney Morning Herald). After inspecting the
damage to the Gift Shop, John Howard cut short a planned meeting
with ACTU President Jenny George and said:
... never under any circumstances will my Government buckle to
threats of physical violence or behaviour of that kind (Canberra
Times, 20 August 1996, p. I).
The ACTU leadership had invested so much in securing a

positive media response to the event that they were at a loss to respond
to the reporting of the violence. The media's story of the rally as a
political disaster came to be accepted as truth. There was very little
effort made to recover anything positive from the event, to focus
more on the majority who had participated peacefully in listening to
the speeches. No doubt this reflected the uphill battle any such effort
would have faced in the mainstream press. Bill Kelty was the only
official who rather hopefully voiced the opinion of many at the rally
who had not participated in the skirmish by declaring it a 'success'.
But this only served to further inflame the media and the government,
and was not backed up by other officials. They seemed to have
accepted the Sydney Morning Herald s assessment that "The ACTU
will lose - on the Workplace Relations Bill and any other issue - if it
abandons reasoned argument for the blunt and dangerous weapon of
mass demonstrations" (August 201996, p. 13).
Some weeks after the rally, the ACTU issued a statement which
expressed regret at what had happened, and concluded by stating
that:
While the actions of the tiny minority have undoubtedly done harm
to the collective union movement, the extent of the union and
community opposition displayed that day highlights our
determination to continue to campaign in opposition to the Howard
Government's industrial relations legislation (quoted in Norington
1998, p. 302).
But after weeks of mainstream attacks on the union movement,
these statements and others like them in union and community
journals could have little effect in changing the 'truth' of what had
happened, even within the union movement itself, let alone in the
wider public sphere. In 1998, journalists writing about the Waterfront
dispute wrote that the ACTU would be unlikely to support mass
rallies in favour of MUA members - after all, "Could the ACTU .,.
survive another disaster such as storming the doors of Parliament
House in 1996?" (Trinca and Norington 1998).
So, within the wider public sphere, the actions of those who broke
away from the sanctioned activities were considered as illegal,
violent, undemocratic, un-Australian. From the perspective of the
union leadership, they were considered to have done irreparable
damage to the union movement's reputation, undermining the
intentions of the rally by engaging in unsanctioned activities. Both
of these perspectives focus on the protest's attempt to use Parliament
House as a space for representation, in the process of making
mediated claims in the wider public sphere.
But the events of the day also clearly demonstrate that the
opinions and values of a counterpublic are not entirely formed prior
to their actual performance in a protest in public space. They can be
read as reflecting more than disrespect for the law, or a lack ofpolitical
discipline. It could be argued that dissatisfaction with the tactics of
the ACTU, in pursuing a media-driven strategy for change,
contributed to the actions taken by those who engaged in the attempt
to break through the front doors of the Parliament. This dissatisfaction
came to be expressed spatially by breaking away from the sanctioned
speeches across the road. The public space of the Parliament was
used by some as a space for formation - they rejected participation
in a compliant, media-driven protest, and attempted to steer the
counterpublic gathered on that day towards more direct action. The
ACTU leaders had assumed before the rally that their counterpublic
was stable, that it had already existed. On this basis they had provided
only one option for participation in the rally - standing in front of
the stage listening to speeches. They had not anticipated that there
would be some who wanted to express opinions critical of their
leadership and that these opinions would be expressed
spatially. They were proved spectacularly wrong, and their
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attempt to represent a wider counterpublic which shared their values
and goals through this protest was thwarted.

Aboriginal Tent Embassy 1990s

i"i'

The site facing the entrance of Old Parliament House was first
occupied by Aboriginal protesters in 1972, with the establishment
of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. This Embassy was later removed,
but the site was re-occupied by Aboriginal protesters in 1992 on the
twentieth anniversary of the original occupation, in a protest in
support of Aboriginal sovereignty and land rights (Wilson 1992).
Those who maintain the Embassy in its current form are highly critical
of recent negotiated settlements on the native title, and the
reconciliation agenda that has been accepted by the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) (see for example
Embassy 1999).
Those who re-established the Embassy have used the public space
outside Old Parliament House as both a space for representation
and a space for formation. This protest is using the occupation of a
public space to make claims in the wider public sphere, and within
an Aboriginal counterpublic. The Embassy provides information
about Aboriginal claims for justice to passers-by, and represents,
according to its occupants, the ramshackle living conditions endured
by thousands of Aboriginal people across Australia (see for example
Martin 1999). But, as stated above, it is also engaged in a dialogue
with Aboriginal leaders and organisations such as ATSIC, who it
believes have sold out Aboriginal claims for justice and sovereignty
(Embassy 1999). Of course in doing so, the Embassy occupants have
ignored planning regulations which discourage the occupation of
land in the Parliamentary Triangle in this way.
It is not surprising, then, that as the Tent Embassy site has
expanded since 1992, it has been the source of controversy in
Canberra and beyond. It was revealed in the press earlier this year
that the Commonwealth Government had quietly gazetted a trespass
ordinance from 1932, in a move widely seen as part of plans to remove
the Embassy (see for example Ludlow 1999; McCabe 1999). Tent
Embassy activists strongly opposed such moves, and took their
protest to the front of the new Parliament. Their attempts to maintain
a protest in this new space were continually thwarted by police, who
removed fires and ceremonial structures that had been placed there
by the protesters (see Ludlow and AAP 1999). Minister for
Reconciliation Philip Ruddock eventually met with the Tent Embassy
protesters, who have now moved back to the site facing Old
Parliament House.
Senator Ian MacDonald, now Minister for Territories, and the
Minister who has driven the current agenda to remove the Embassy
and replace it with a memorial, has for some time held a view that
the Embassy no longer has a place in the Parliamentary Zone. During
an Inquiry into the Right to Protest on Parliamentary Land held in
1995, he asked Lowitja O'Donoghue, then Chairperson of ATSIC:
Wasn't it the idea that it was called an embassy because of the fact
that Aboriginal people had no recognition, no voice, no means of
getting justice across? (quoted in Inquiry into the Right to
Legitimately Protest, Transcript ofEvidence, 1995, p. 450)
Surely, he asked, the formation ofATSIC alleviated this concern?
He might also have added that in front of the new Parliament House,
there was a permanent and much more aesthetically pleasing
recognition of Aboriginal culture in the form of Michael Jagamara
Nelson's mosaic. He went on to suggest that the 'ramshackle' sheds
of the current embassy might be replaced with some kind of memorial
sculpture - an argument he has repeated in recent public debates
(Harvey 1999).
But O'Donoghue and Matilda House of the local.

Ngunnawal people rejected this logic. House described the way the
current embassy serves as an important meeting place for Aboriginal
people coming to Canberra as activists and supporters. According to
O'Donoghue, this included people who might not express their views
through the political (or artistic?) channels which might suit
politicians such as Macdonald:
There are many Aboriginal people outside of the Commission
(ATSIC) itself who want to be able to make their voice heard and do
not want to necessarily make it heard through the official elected
representatives (quoted in Inquiry into the Right to Legitimately
Protest, Transcript ofEvidence, 1995, p. 451).
Of particular interest to me here is that despite the Tent Embassy's
criticism of ATSIC, it is nonetheless valued by those such as
O'Donoghue who are the targets of such criticism within the
Aboriginal counterpublic. The current Chairperson of ATSIC, Gatjil
Djerrkura, has also supported the occupants of the Tent Embassy in
the recent debates over its status. In a Melbourne Herald Sun article
titled "We stand by that tent", he wrote:
The tent embassy was established to demonstrate to Australians that
Aboriginal people have never ceded sovereignty and to bring to
national attention our continuing quest for land. ATSIC shares in
these ideals. Where differences are found on our approach to issues
we can sit together and reconcile them (Djerrkura 1999).
Because of such differences, a Sydney Morning Herald editorial
stated:
This division no doubt explains why mainstream Aboriginal leaders
have so far been notably quiet about the disturbances at the
"embassy". Yet the more the Government is seen to be acting to
obliterate the "embassy", the more that moderate Aboriginal leaders
will be obliged to support the men with spears who are now engaging
the attention of police in Canberra (Sydney Morning Herald, 17
February 1999, p. 12).
But the very public support of Djerrkura and others such as
Charlie Perkins early in the dispute contradict this statement Djerrkura's article was published on the very next day, and Perkins
had appeared on commercial radio almost one month before. And
the history of support for the Embassy suggests that the openness of
the Aboriginal counterpublic to internal diversity and debate predates
its hand being forced by the current Coalition Government.
The media's response to the violent scuffles outside new
Parliament House over the future of the Tent Embassy has been mixed
in comparison with the universal condemnation of the ACTU rally,
and reflects the degree of support for the Embassy within the
Aboriginal community and the wider public sphere. Conservative
columnists such as Piers Ackerman in the Daily Telegraph have
predictably condemned the Embassy - very cleverly telling occupants
that "They must be dreaming" (Ackerman 1999). But others in the
mainstream press have criticised the actions of the government. The
Canberra Times editor, for example, has argued that the "Tent
Embassy has earned its place" (January 27, 1999, p. 8). Coverage
has more often focused on the defiance of Aboriginal people in the
face of government attacks, rather than on any accusations of
disorderly behaviour or illegality, with headlines such as "Move Tents
and We'll Fight", "Outrage at threat to pack up embassy" and "We
will not be moved, vows tent embassy" (see for example Harvey
1999; MacDonald 1999; Martin 1999; McCabe 1999; McCabe 1999).
Interestingly then, this contlict or debate within the counterpublic
itself has not wholly compromised the process of making a claim in
the wider public sphere. The Tent Embassy's wider claims about
lands rights and sovereignty, and its representative function,
are supported by a wide range of participants in the Aboriginal
counterpublic, including those such as ATSIC leaders whose
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tactics are opposed by Tent Embassy occupants. The support of
ATSIC and other 'mainstream' Aboriginal leaders is not wholly
conditional on the Tent Embassy's compliance with ATSIC policy.
The Embassy is supported as a space for representation even as it is
used by some who wish to challenge ATSIC as an oppositional space
for formation.
The main question now is whether the government will allow
Aboriginal people to conduct debates over the future of the Tent
Embassy without violent interference, or whether attempts will be
made to remove the Embassy from the Parliamentary Triangle. Such
actions would surely 'represent' a government intent on imposing
its own preferred vision of Aboriginality (in the form of a nice
memorial), at the expense of other kinds of Aboriginality negotiated
and formed by Aboriginal people themselves. The above analysis
suggests that any such attempts will continue to be met with
opposition by Aboriginal people and their supporters.

Conclusions
There are a range of conclusions I want to draw from this analysis.
Protest events should be planned and evaluated from a dual
perspectives - that is, for the role they play in both representation
and formation of the counterpublic in question. I have argued in
particular that the ACTU failed to consider how public space is used
in formation. The end result was that the process of formation, of
debating tactics and aims, was expressed spatially, in a way that
affected both how the protest was represented, and whether the
counterpublic could be sustained. Attempts by leaders to close down
avenues for formation and debate within a counterpublic, so as to
present a united front for the wider public sphere, may well be
counterproductive, and are unlikely to succeed if other opportunities
and spaces for formation and debate are not established.
I am not suggesting that adopting a dual perspective on the
organisation of a protest guarantees that it will be successful in both
representing the claims of a counterpublic or allowing it to form in
an unproblematic way. I have drawn a distinction between the way
in which an Aboriginal counterpublic has valued uses of space for
formation as well as representation, and the way the ACTU in August
1996 failed to see beyond their own needs for representation. I have
also argued that the leadership ofthe Aboriginal counterpublic have
shown stronger political will in backing those who may disagree
with their tactics, by supporting the Embassy in the face of attacks
by government. But these differences alone have not assured the
Tent Embassy protest greater success. The Tent Embassy also has
history on its side - police and the government sought to remove it
in a provocative way. The Embassy itself also occupies a less
important space outside the old Parliament, which has allowed it
time to more fully develop as a space for formation. And finally, the
Tent Embassy story broke around Australia Day 1999, at a time when
the media were already engaged in some discussion of the Howard
Government's failure to embrace Reconciliation.
This is another way of restating my earlier claim that the process
of managing public space as both a space for formation and a space
for representation must be conducted in a context largely set by land
managers and the mass media - both of whom are beyond the control
of most protesting counterpublics.
But protest organisers can take some control over how they are
represented by thinking though how protests are organised from the
dual perspective I have presented here. The Aboriginal counterpublic
has been successful in this regard. Perth unions who organised a
mass rally shortly after the ACTU rally in 1996 against state industrial
relations legislation also provided a range of options for
participation in their protest - many involving public art
tactics, such as street theatre and the construction of a workers
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embassy. These art strategies were conceived of as ways to facilitate
active participation in the protest, in the hope of better controlling
behaviour and consequently the response of the mainstream media.
The workers embassy also provided a space for debate in the
formation of a movement against conservative industrial relations
reform (McAtee 1997). (Of course, there is a fine line here between
expression and control.)
Finally, it is worth noting some consequences of this analysis
for those engaged in regulating protest activity in public space. In
order for state agencies to plan for protest, they need a stable
leadership group who can make guarantees on behalf of protest
participants. But from the analysis above, this is clearly not always
realistic, nor is it necessarily desirable for the counterpublic itself.
The ACTU had made such guarantees, which proved to be worthless,
because they simply did not represent a stable counterpublic - as I
have argued, this counterpublic was in a state of formation during
the protest. By contrast, in their dealings with people like Senator
MacDonald, Aboriginal leaders such as 0 'Donoghue and Djerrkura
have resisted being forced into a position of speaking for all
Aboriginal people. But of course, theirresolve to value debate within
their counterpublic ahead of the needs of the state has made the job
of planning difficult. Attempts by state agencies to plan for protest
will thus inevitably bring them into conflict with protesters attempting
to develop effective protest tactics.
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